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ABSTRACT: In this paper I examine the similarities between Paul Taylor’s and Aristotle’s 
teleological accounts as outlined in Taylor’s concept of biocentric egalitarianism from Respect 
for Nature and Aristotle’s concept of “for the sake of” from Politics I.8, and I show how 
Aristotle’s account can partially support Taylor’s. I discuss Aristotle’s virtue ethics and what 
they offer in terms of piecing together an environmental ethic, and I draw attention to an implied 
value—recipient value—that assigns significant worth to all living things “for the sake of” that is 
similar to Taylor’s biocentric egalitarianism. Lastly I address two problems that arise for 
Taylor’s egalitarianism and reevaluate the extent to which Aristotle’s teleological account may 
support Taylor’s. 
 
Introduction 
In his book Respect for Nature and essay “The Ethics of Respect for Nature,” Paul Taylor 
offers an individualistic ethic, biocentric egalitarianism, as a way with which to frame nature’s 
value. Biocentric egalitarianism puts forth the view that all living things have equal worth as 
“teleological centers of life;”1 in other words, every living thing has its own biological interest 
and with that its own end—telos. All other capacities—such as sentience2 or rationality3—are not 
counted as holders of relevant value.  Nonliving things, including water, rocks, and other abiotic 
things that comprise the habitats in which living things dwell, are considered lacking in similar 
(intrinsic) value,4 and larger groups of animals, such as biotic communities and species, are 
                                                 
1. Paul W. Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature,” Environmental Ethics 3/3 (1981): 210. 
 
2. Ibid, 200.  
 
3. Ibid, 211. 
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considered subordinate in value.5 However, Taylor’s egalitarianism comes under fire when he 
claims that it is less wrong to kill animals than plants for food and when humans’ non-biological 
(extraneous) interests are granted more significance than biological interests of animals and 
plants; these problems will be addressed later on in the paper. In this paper I discuss the above 
problems for Taylor’s egalitarianism and demonstrate the partial support Aristotle’s teleology 
gives Taylor’s nominal egalitarianism—and the full support it offers once the label thereof is 
stripped away. 
Aristotle and Nature 
Environmental ethics is a relatively modern discipline, and therefore no clear account 
defining the proper treatment of nature is given in Aristotle’s works. This makes a comparison 
with Taylor’s proposed ethics less straightforward. In order to do so, it is necessary to examine 
Aristotle’s descriptions of nature and living things. It is also necessary to study his human ethics 
to find a model for the treatment of nonhuman things.6 
While Aristotle’s teleological account offers no disinterested motive for caring for things 
in nature, it is possible to draw from his human ethics to defend the treatment. In Nicomachean 
                                                                                                                                                             
4. Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 123. 
Nonliving things are said to lack well-being, and they are excluded from Taylor’s life-centered 
egalitarianism as a result. The value of nonliving things lies solely in what they contribute to 
living things’ ability to thrive. 
 
5. Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature,” 199. While community wholes and species are 
said to have goods of their own, these goods are determined by how well living individuals are 
able to live within these groups. Here priority is clearly placed on the well being of individuals. 
Therefore Taylor’s view also falls under the label of biocentric individualism. 
 
6. Susanne E. Foster, “Aristotle and the Environment,” Environmental Ethics 24/4 (2002): 420. 
Here Foster turns to Nicomachean Ethics in showing how Aristotle’s virtue ethics can be 
extended to nature and nonhumans. Alain Ducharme does so, as well, to argue against the claim 
that Aristotle supports the dominion thesis in “Aristotle and the Dominion of Nature,” 8-9. I turn 
to a later section of Nicomachean Ethics to make a similar point. 
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Ethics he claimed that it is best to be a self-lover rather than to love others over himself, acting in 
self-interest in the sense that he wants to acquire as many virtuous deeds for himself as possible.7 
This self-lover loves himself through others and their hardships, as he finds opportunity to help. 
If his aim is to acquire as much virtuous action for himself as he can, it makes sense for him to 
increase his pool of virtuous activity by looking outside of human interests. Thus, to be most 
virtuous, he should care for nature and desist from misusing it. Taylor would, of course, hold that 
any such actions for moral subjects should be done for the sake of moral subjects (nonhumans) 
not the acting moral agents (humans),8 but the outcomes of applying Taylor’s biocentric 
egalitarianism and Aristotle’s human virtue ethics from Nicomachean Ethics would likely be 
similar. Because environmental ethics is such a young field, many of its ethics are inspired by or 
taken from existing human-centered ethics.9 For this reason, applying the self-lover example 
from Nicomachean Ethics to nonhumans is hardly controversial. 
Recipient Value 
Under Taylor’s view, all living things have equal intrinsic value10 as derived from their 
teleological nature. He describes a living thing’s goal or end as “the full development of its 
biological powers.” Thence the living thing has a biological interest to survive—to which Taylor 
refers as “a good of its own”—wherefrom stems the value inherent in the living thing, since 
                                                 
7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX.8, 1169a34-5 (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999), 
263. 
 
8. Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature,” 201. 
 
9. Tom Regan. “The radical egalitarian case for animal rights.” Environmental Ethics, 3rd edition. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell (2001), 41. Regan applies Kant’s Categorical Imperative to nonhumans. 
 
10. Taylor, Respect for Nature, 72-73. Here it should be noted that I use “intrinsic value” to 
denote Taylor’s concept of “inherent worth.” In Respect for Nature, “intrinsic value” refers to a 
different idea. 
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biological interest is morally relevant.11 If this biological interest is hindered so the living thing 
cannot reach its end, the living thing finds itself harmed in its own right since its biological 
interest holds value: it is not something whose being affected affects only outside parties 
positively or negatively (in the way owners may be affected by the destruction of their 
[nonliving] property). 
Aristotle’s teleology may at first appear to contradict this concept of value in other living 
things due to the tricky language of “for the sake of” in Politics I.8, which is commonly 
interpreted as supporting human dominion.12 Therein, Aristotle states: “After the birth of 
animals, plants exist for their sake, and… the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame 
for use and the wild, if not at all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision 
of clothing and various instruments.”13 Plants and animals sustain humans. Thus they exist “for 
the sake of” humans in the sense that they contribute to human survival.14 This isn’t to say that 
their main ends or goods are to sustain us.15 Aristotle’s teleology is not anthropocentric or 
dominion-related as commonly claimed; in the passage in the Politics Chapter 8 wherein he 
                                                 
11. Ibid, 199. 
 
12. Alain Ducharme, “Aristotle and the Domination of Nature,” 2-3. In Practical Ethics, Peter 
Singer claims that Aristotle’s Politics I.8 (1256b16-22), specifically the vocabulary of other 
living things existing “for the sake of” humans, justifies human dominion. This has become a 
common reading of the passage. 
 
13. Aristotle, Politics, I.8, 1256b17-20. 
 
14. Ducharme, 5. 
 
15. Aristotle, On The Soul, II.3, 415b1-3. Aristotle gives two different definitions of “for the 
sake of:” that end for which each living thing strives, or that for what or whom the living thing 
acts. Because he gives the goal of all living things as growing so “it may partake in the eternal 
and divine,” it seems that when he states that plants and animals are “for the sake of” humans in 
Politics I.8, he means the latter definition—that for what or whom the living thing acts. 
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explains the art of acquisition: “…the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not 
unlimited,” the wasting of resources seems to be discouraged.16 
In On the Soul, Aristotle says the following: “…the most natural act is the production of 
another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its 
nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine. That is the goal towards which all things 
strive, that for the sake of which they do whatsoever their nature renders possible.”17 Essentially, 
the goal or end of living things is to fulfill their biological interests to survive as an individual 
and as a species. This is found in Taylor’s argument, as well, making his account of teleology 
and its role in nature value extremely similar to Aristotle’s. As a matter of fact, Aristotle’s “for 
the sake of” plays quite well into Taylor’s biocentric egalitarianism. If Aristotle’s account is 
applied, it becomes apparent that all living things exist as recipients of “for the sake of,” in the 
sense that living things are sustained by other factors in nature. 
Taylor maintains that all living things have equal value under biocentric egalitarianism. 
Therefore, Aristotle’s “for the sake of” does not only cover contribution of living things to other 
living things or to the instrumental value of being able to contribute; it also covers contribution 
to living things and the value of benefiting from this contribution. These living things draw 
sustenance from a variety of sources, and these sources are a reason for their survival. In essence, 
they are living in part because of these sources. Living for another reason besides being “good 
for” something (indicative of instrumental value) gives it intrinsic value. 
All living things can be considered recipients, that is, benefiting from other nature 
components “for the sake of” them. While this value differs from a living thing’s teleological 
                                                 
16. Aristotle, Politics, I.8, 1256b30-31. 
 
17. Aristotle, On The Soul, II.3, 415a28-415b1. 
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value (which arises from a living thing’s goal-oriented quality rather than its recipient nature), it 
does denote an egalitarianism of the same variety that Taylor proposes, if all other qualities such 
as sentience or rationality are not counted as holders of relevant value. However, Aristotle does 
count rationality as relevant value, and his teleology does not support an egalitarian ethic such as 
the one Taylor proposes. This point will be further addressed later on. 
This recipient value is relevant because it relates directly to the life quality and its 
significance, which is present in both Aristotle’s and Taylor’s teleological accounts: Taylor 
places the highest value on living things, and Aristotle claims that “the living, having soul, is 
thereby better than the lifeless which has none, and being is better than not being, living than not 
living.”18 It assigns significant value to living things under “for the sake of,” showing that they 
all have relevant worth and that humans are not the only beneficiaries of “for the sake of,” when 
Aristotle’s account is applied. This places all living things closer to humans in value because 
they have the same benefit: and although Aristotle’s works support the general hierarchy (1. 
Humans 2. Animals 3. Plants), this application of his “for the sake of” concept brings his 
classification of living things’ intrinsic value closer to Taylor’s egalitarianism—and even closer 
once the objections challenging Taylor’s egalitarianism are examined. 
Value Objection 
The first objection to biocentric egalitarianism to consider is that if all things have value, 
they are all equally valueless.19 This is a negative reading of the fact that no living thing holds 
                                                 
18. Aristotle, On The Generation of Animals, II.1, 731b28-30. Susanne E. Foster makes note of 
this passage to show Aristotle’s bias toward the living in “Aristotle and the Environment,” 
Environmental Ethics 24/4 (2002): 413. Additionally, Alain Ducharme shows the fundamental 
parallels between Aristotle and Taylor’s teleological accounts in “Aristotle and the Dominion of 
Nature,” 11n. 
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more intrinsic value than another in egalitarianism. This has negative implications for 
egalitarianism—one, of course, being that value should not be considered this way, and two 
being that egalitarianism rids everything of all significant value. (The latter is an implication 
taken from the negative reading: nothing is valuable in relation to each other.) If it is right that 
we believe these implications, Taylor, by assigning every living thing equal intrinsic value, has 
essentially stripped every living thing of actual intrinsic value. 
This, of course, implies that nothing has value. This would seem to be because, generally, 
products in greater numbers are perceived to be less valuable than in fewer numbers. This 
principle seems to be coming into play here. However, it does not apply to life-sustaining 
qualities such as Taylor’s teleology: for example, one will not devalue his having a life simply 
based on the fact that everyone around him, also, has lives. (It could be that one could compare 
the quality of his life to another’s and thereupon become depressed. However, this is not the 
same type of consideration.) While self-ascriptions of value and actual intrinsic value are not 
interchangeable, perception of value can be an indicator of value20—and life has obvious value 
under a biocentric ethic. Thus, the quality of being able to be harmed or helped retains its value 
even in great numbers. It is not diminished by universality (all living things possessing it), or by 
uniformity (all living things possessing it equally). 
The cornerstone idea of Taylor’s “Respect for Nature” is that all living things will be 
respected. Even if biocentric egalitarianism (or any egalitarianism) entails that nothing is 
valuable by relation, this has no consequence on all the living things who are respected 
                                                                                                                                                             
19. Timothy Clark. The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and the Environment. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2011), 106. 
 
20. I am not claiming that a living thing must be able to realize its value in order to have value—
I merely state that, while perception of value is not the same as value itself, perception of value is 
not entirely irrelevant to actual value. 
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adequately under this ethic. By all living things being respected adequately, I mean that no living 
thing will be unjustly or offhandedly deprived of its right to survival, speciesism and other 
prejudices will not come into play, and the treatment to all living things will be completely fair 
and unbiased under the rules Taylor has laid out in Respect for Nature. Were his egalitarianism 
to be realized, the relative worthlessness of each living thing would not hinder it from 
flourishing. This objection is an empty appeal to hierarchy where none is necessary for all living 
things to have value and be treated as holders of value. 
Death Objection 
While Aristotle’s ratiocentrism would indicate a hierarchy, he, like Taylor, places special 
value on the quality of life. Besides which, people may disagree with what an egalitarianism 
would require. Taylor supports an egalitarianism between the living things of nature (between 
humans and nonhumans) without advocating the view that nonhumans have rights, and he 
maintains that it is possible to support one without having to support the other. 
By avoiding talk of the moral rights of animals and plants we do not lend aid to those who have no respect 
for them. On the contrary, by explaining the grounds on which we commit ourselves to the ethics of respect 
for nature, we give a solid basis for rejecting any human-centered viewpoint that would justify an 
exploitative attitude toward the Earth’s wild creatures. Since we can in this way establish the four duties 
[Rule of Nonmaleficence, Rule of Noninterference, Rule of Fidelity, Rule of Restitutive Justice] that 
embody respect for all wild living things without using an extended conception of moral rights, it is best 
that the original idea of moral rights be accepted in its full, uncompromised meaning as applicable to 
humans alone.21 
 
Here Taylor views moral rights at best as anthropogenic (coming from humans), since ethics 
were originally human-centered. By not pressing for the moral rights of nonhumans, he avoids 
applying human labels or values to nature—that which does not come from humans. For valuing 
nature on the basis of moral rights, which were originally all applied to humans—by humans and 
for humans—shows that people have not departed very far from human habits, and human habits 
                                                 
21. Taylor, Respect for Nature, 226. 
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and assumptions about nature have encouraged the exploitation of nature and the justification of 
dominion. Having respect for nature on its own terms, rather than on the terms of humans, would 
allow people to hold a truer respect for nature. 
By leaving this point open, Taylor sets up a point on which his and Aristotle’s views 
merge: the varying amount of damage on harming different types of things in nature, which sets 
up for the following objection: that, under biocentric egalitarianism, killing a plant would be as 
bad as killing a human, if all things were to have equal value. 
In Respect for Nature, Taylor discusses vegetarianism and fights what would appear to be 
the view necessitated by his ethic—that it would be equally as bad to kill an animal as it would 
to kill a plant, so an omnivorous diet would have as little consequence as an herbivorous diet 
would. However, because animals are sentient and plants are not, he maintains that killing an 
animal and causing it pain (or supporting industries in which animal cruelty is commonplace) is 
worse than killing a plant, a living thing that cannot feel pain, and so if killing sentient animals 
can at all be avoided, it should.22 This isn’t because being hurt is worse than being harmed, or 
even that being hurt and harmed is worse than being harmed (when hurt applies to sentient 
beings and harmed applies to insentient beings), but because pain is an undesirable state for 
others and can be avoided. (Killing plants can’t be avoided, since humans can’t live healthily on 
an entirely animal-based diet.) Although Taylor appears to support an egalitarian ethic and 
Aristotle a hierarchy, both would maintain that it is worse to kill a certain type of living being 
than the other. Taylor would maintain that it is bad to kill a plant (or animal) other than for 
sustenance23 (in the need to fulfill our own biological interest), the most basic type of living 
                                                 
22. Taylor, Respect for Nature, 295. 
 
23. Ibid, 183. 
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thing covered, because to do so would cut off its biological interest to survive. Given the section 
in Politics I.8 regarding the acquisition of goods, “…the amount of property which is needed for 
a good life is not unlimited,” it seems that Aristotle’s reasoning would support the wrongness in 
pointlessly killing a plant, as well. 
Taylor does not argue for the rights of nonhumans as such. However, it seems that his 
ethics entails some rights—negative rights, or rights from harm, at the very least. His 
endorsement of vegetarianism could appear somewhat hierarchical. However, if it were 
hierarchical, then the needs of animals would always be considered over those of plants, since 
animals would be considered to have more value. This isn’t the case. 
This might be cleared up in the following passage: “It [the individual nonhuman 
organism] possesses whatever capacities it needs for successfully coping with its environment 
and so preserving its existence throughout the various stages of the normal life cycle of its 
species.”24 Capacities seem to play into biological interest and fall under biological interest. 
Therefore, because their value is covered by biological interest, which counts for equal value 
among all living organisms, they have no outstanding value. This stays in line with 
egalitarianism. It seems that, if forced to choose between killing two types of organisms in a case 
of conflicting interest, we may look to certain relevant qualities outside of biological interest but 
are essential to a living thing fulfilling its good—for instance, that of sentience, which wants for 
avoidance of suffering—based on some of these capacities. 
Nonetheless, this is still somewhat problematic. A possible solution for his egalitarianism 
could involve living things having negative rights based on the qualities of different types of 
                                                 
24. Taylor, “Ethics of Respect for Nature,” 199. 
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living things. (He actually does say that nonhumans have “rights” in this sense.25) All living 
things have biological interests, some have sentience (animals, generally), and some have the 
ability to reason. Based on this and the rules of biocentric egalitarianism, plants have the right 
not to be harmed. Animals have the right not to be harmed or hurt. Humans have these same 
rights, but they also have a negative right corresponding to their ability to reason. This gives 
them the ability to think ahead and develop long-term goals.26 For simplicity’s sake this will be 
called “the pursuit of happiness,” happiness being in a sense of having completed nonbasic 
interests.27 All other living beings who can reason have this right, but for the sake of argument 
we will assume that this ability is unique to humans. Because humans do have this, they feel a 
loss without pursuit. They know happiness (in the above sense of accomplishment) and know 
when it is absent, and they feel their lives suffer without it. Thus, humans have the right not to be 
harmed, hurt, or deprived of their pursuits of happiness (as long as their rights don’t infringe 
upon the rights of others28). 
                                                 
25. Taylor, Respect for Nature, 253. 
 
26. This begins to resemble Gary Varner’s concept of ground projects and categorical desires in 
“Biocentric Individualism” in Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What Really Works, 
ed. David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willot (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 96. 
 
27. Here I borrow Taylor’s terms of basic and nonbasic interests (Respect for Nature 273), basic 
interests being those related to survival and nonbasic interests being all others unrelated to 
survival. 
 
28. Taylor lists exceptions for this rule (Respect for Nature, 281-2) since many of humans’ major 
(nonbasic) pursuits harm other living things in nature in some way (for example, through the use 
of paper). If one chooses a life pursuit that harms nature in a minor way but contributes to human 
culture and sense of community, he is obligated to ensure that he harms as little as possible and 
to try to make up for the harm by performing some act of restitutive justice, or doing good for 
nature in a subsequent act. Presumably, this is in regard to humans’ ability to reason and look 
ahead; they would feel a sense of deprivation from not applying themselves toward long-term 
goals, given their abilities. This deprivation would be considered a wrong in the same way pain 
is considered a wrong, so human needs can be considered over those of nonhumans in these 
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Here, rights would not correspond directly to the value amount. (Otherwise Taylor would 
have been obligated to argue for the rights of animals and plants.) Rights are based on the 
differing capacities of living things. Having Right 1 (Biological Interest) and Right 2 (Sentience) 
would not give a nonhuman animal more value than a plant with Right 1 (Biological Interest). 
We might; a starving cheetah might have the right to use his speed to eat us. 
Conclusion 
Taylor’s view does seem to enter the territory of a weak egalitarianism, one that admits of 
certain actions being more wrong than others even when all such actions affect beings of equal 
intrinsic value. Aristotle makes no argument for egalitarianism among all living things. 
However, his value of living things over nonliving things is apparent, providing for a similar 
principle to Taylor’s if Taylor is to make this concession toward the varying immorality of 
harms. Although Taylor argues for egalitarianism in name and Aristotle does not, they both 
contend that some actions are intrinsically worse than others in consideration of a being’s 
qualities other than that of living. Perhaps Aristotle’s view is still not as strict as Taylor’s in that 
it may permit a human’s interest to be considered over a plant’s even in a minor conflict of 
interest (such as plucking and pressing a flower). That Taylor only admits of this in certain 
instances is not relevant to the broader context. Though the accounts may entail slightly different 
actions as a result from varying levels of consideration towards living things, their accounts of 
nature, regarding the value that living things contain in the capacity of being living things and 
having biological interests, may be regarded as identical or nearly so. 
                                                                                                                                                             
cases, just as animal sentience gives animals greater consideration over plants on the subject of 
an omnivorous vs. herbivorous diet. Here it is important to note that basic nonhuman interests 
ordinarily have priority over nonbasic human interests, so this is not a case of species favoritism. 
 
 14 
 
Aristotle’s philosophy cannot offer a complete endorsement of biocentric egalitarianism, 
but it appears that this is also true of Taylor’s own view. This allows for Taylor and Aristotle to 
meet in the middle, with Taylor’s concession that it is worse to harm some types of living things 
than others in certain instances and with Aristotle’s basic account of living things as holders of 
intrinsic value with ends. As a result, Aristotle can support Taylor’s basic argument in theory, if 
not in name.  
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